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In the early 21st century criminal victimisation is everywhere. From high-definition videos of 
the latest terrorist atrocities beamed into our homes, our phones and our laptops by 24-hour 
news networks2 to the bite-size, personal, accounts from victims of crime, their families and 
their supporters appearing on our social media feeds. Under such conditions, members of the 
public can feel more personally connected with such instances of victimisation than at any time 
in recent history. Whether it be the collective outrage felt when terrorists strike at the ‘heart of 
our democracy’3 or a deep sense of personal empathy felt for the victims of historic sexual 
abuse coming forward to ‘tell their stories’4, the notion of ‘standing alongside’ and showing 
‘solidarity’ with the directly victimised is becoming ubiquitous in modern society. Under such 
conditions, public consciousness has become flooded with concepts like ‘post-traumatic stress’ 
and ‘trauma’. At the same time, an increasingly-informed public can engage like never before 
in detailed debates over how precisely such victims should be treated and what they should 
expect from the criminal justice process. In the flurry of such debates, opinions from members 
of the public on highly technical legal issues – such as the cross-examination of rape victims 
in court, compensation for victims of violent crime and the nature of ‘consent’ in sexual 
offences – are now routinely juxtaposed with those of agents of the state, prosecutors, lawyers, 
politicians and professional scholars. 
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This paper sets out to marry three areas of concern to modern victimology. In the first instance 
the paper will explore the ‘cultural turn’ taken in our understandings of what it means to be a 
victim of crime in the twenty first century. This paper will explore the interaction between 
cultural understandings of victimhood and the political and policy forces which, since at least 
the late 1990s, have pledged to ‘rebalance’ the criminal justice systems of England and Wales 
and other jurisdictions to put victims ‘at the heart’ of those processes. The paper will then move 
on to combine these two areas in seeking to expose some of the complications that exist when 
attempting to reconcile seemingly ever-expanding understandings of victimisation with legal 






So-called ‘cultural victimology’ represents a relatively new direction taken in the 
victimological literature over recent years in an attempt to incorporate a number of features of 
the modern social, political and cultural landscape which both surrounds and permeates the 
notion of being a ‘victim’. These features include the increasingly visual nature of social life 
and the symbolic displays of shared emotion that go along with this. In this context, the notion 
of ‘standing alongside’ victims of crime becomes more prevalent. Victims of crime (and their 
supporters) in turn provide increasingly public accounts of the harm they suffer. Cultural 
victimologists are also interested in the means by which the victimisation experience is mapped 
through the workings of the criminal justice system. Through such a process, public narratives 
concerning these experiences are developed, some of which become features of a shared 
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cultural understanding about what it means to be victimised. In short, cultural victimology 
foregrounds suffering, how it is presented to society and what sense that society then makes of 
it. This reaches beyond standard critical victimology approaches to place emphasis on the 
nature of victimization itself in addition to the social standing of the person or group being 
victimised5. 
 
At the forefront of this development, McGarry and Walklate6 characterise cultural victimology 
as broadly comprising of two key aspects. These are the wider sharing and reflection of 
individual and collective victimisation experiences on the one hand and, on the other, the 
mapping of those experiences through the criminal justice process. I have previously drawn 
upon the work of Hans Boutellier7, whose discussion of victimisation and morality in a secular 
society to some degree foreshadowed this trend. Boutellier argued that, as the process of 
secularisation goes on, common standards of morality decline but common appreciation and 
sympathy for the impacts on those who have suffered harmed remains and takes over as a 
shared moral barometer for society. In more recent parlance, we could say that such 
victimisation becomes incorporated into the fabric of our social culture. The author refers to 
this as the ‘victimalization of morality’. Furedi in pioneering aspects of the cultural approach 
made a similar point in terms of social solidarity with victims in the UK context: 
 
“It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, with British people feeling so 
fragmented, the ritual of grieving [for victims] provides one of the few 
experiences that create a sense of belonging”8 
 
Central to this cultural approach to victimisation is an understanding of victimhood as a 
dynamic and developing concept, both in terms of society’s understanding of it and the 
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individual (or group) victim’s personal experience. Significantly for the present discussion, if 
victimisation is now shared, defined and recognised as a matter of culture then recognition of 
‘victim status’ becomes subjected to the ever-shifting contours of said culture. To illustrate this 
idea, we can look to the ongoing example from the UK of the Hillsborough football stadium 
disaster. 
 
The Hillsborough disaster is the worst sporting-related tragedy in UK history9. It followed a 
human crush in the overcrowded Western Stand (at the time a standing terrace) of the 
Hillsborough Football Stadium in Sheffield, England, during a 1989 Football Association Cup 
Semi-Final. Over 700 people were injured in the crush and 96 people - all supporters of the 
Liverpool Football Club - lost their lives. In the days following the disaster, accusations quickly 
arose from those present, and then the families and supporters of those killed, that poor 
management of the situation by the presiding South Yorkshire Police Force had directly 
contributed, if not caused the tragedy (ibid). At the time, however, these concerns were played 
down in public discourse in favour of the police’s version of events. This version included a 
number of accusations to the effect that the behaviour of the football supporters themselves 
had been the main contributor to the tragedy. These accusations against the supporters were 
most prominently taken up by the Sun newspaper, which was then and remains now Britain’s 
most read newspaper. Four days after the tragedy the Sun ran with the front-page headline “The 
Truth” followed by the sub-headlines: "Some fans picked pockets of victims"; "Some fans 
urinated on the brave cops" and "Some fans beat up PC giving kiss of life". In the years that 
followed, those seeking to expose what they argued to be the gross negligence of the police 
and their vilification of the victims coalesced into a distinct movement – ‘Justice for the 96’ – 
organised by the Hillsborough Family Support Group. This group championed the perspective 
of the families of those killed and injured through an independent inquest in 1991 (which 
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returned a verdict of accidental killing), the subsequent quashing of this panel’s findings and 
an attempted private prosecution of the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police in 199810. 
Ultimately, as a result of this unceasing campaign, a second inquest began hearing evidence in 
2014, with a jury of nine delivering verdicts in April 2016 to the effect that the 96 supporters 
had been ‘unlawfully killed’. This jury also found that the supporters themselves bore no blame 
for the disaster11. Following this verdict, the case was examined by the CPS which 
subsequently pursued criminal charges against six individuals, including Former Chief 
Superintendent and match commander on the day, David Duckenfield. 
 
The Hillsborough case exemplifies a great deal about the contemporary cultural context of 
victimisation and victim policy. The story of ‘the 96’ and their families is one of becoming 
victims in the eyes of the establishment and the public at large. The process by which this 
occurred has been frequently described as a ‘journey’12 culminating in a public 
acknowledgement of this status by the Prime Minister after the 2016 verdict was announced. 
On this occasion, David Cameron commentated on the victims’ “long search for the truth”13. 
The progression in the case from 1989 to 2016 is inherently interconnected with much wider 
social and cultural changes from a position in the late 1980s where deference to authority and 
to the media’s presentation of ‘facts’, as well as basic trust in the police, was much more 
prevalent (as discussed by Garland14). Furthermore, in 1989 the largely working class football 
supporters and their families had very little platform to air their own grievances. More broadly, 
the victimisation experience in this case took on a wider cultural component as the City of 
Liverpool itself was increasingly seen as being vilified – especially after the Sun’s headline – 
and its residents the collective victims of a still wider injustice. As noted by the Chair of the 
Hillsborough Supporters Group following the announcement of the 2016 inquest verdict: 
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"Let's be honest about this – people were against us. We had the media against 
us, as well as the establishment. Everything was against us. The only people 
that weren't against us was our own city. That's why I am so grateful to my city 
and so proud of my city. They always believed in us”15 
 
The cultural narrative of a city beset as a collective victim is epitomised by the continued virtual 
boycott of the Sun newspaper in Liverpool16. This notion that victimisation is no longer an 
‘individual’ experience but in many cases transcended the direct (or even indirect) victims to 
include still larger groups within society is a key feature of victimology’s cultural turn. 
 
This development of cultural victimology now challenges victimologists to reconsider some of 
our most entrenched assumptions about our subject matter. For example, few 
conceptualisations of victimisation and the relationship between victimisation, public policy 
and criminal justice reform have been more influential than that of Nils Christie’s widely-
referenced discussion of ‘ideal victims’17. His argument was that some victims are endowed 
by the public and by policy makers with ‘ideal’ status making them ‘worthy’ of public 
sympathy, accommodation, and facilitation of their rights through reform. Cultural victimology 
however has problematized this basic understanding of who is and who is not regarded as a 
genuine victim by focusing increased attention on the process of becoming recognised as a 
victim rather than assuming this as a static concept. Hence, the early characterisations of those 
hurt and killed at Hillsborough as ‘football hooligans’ gave way over time to a far more 
sympathetic public acceptance – and then official acceptance – of their victimised status. 
Significantly, most of the 96 killed at Hillsborough were young18, able-bodied working-class 
men19, some with criminal records20. On the face of it these are not the ideal, vulnerable, 
victims of Christie’s thought, but rather have become so (or recognised as so) over a long 
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period of cultural shift in the public’s overall impression of the police, its deference to authority 
figures and to the media in general. 
 
Another pertinent example of shifting public – and perhaps cultural – understandings of 
victimhood revolve around the sufferers of historic sexual abuse at the hands of clergy of the 
Catholic Church and other historic child sex abuse cases. In the UK context McGarry and 
Walklate21 discuss the cultural relevance of revelations concerning noted television and radio 
celebrity Jimmy Savile that he was engaged in a decades-long campaign of persistent sexual 
abuse against some 300 victims aged between 5 and 75 years old. Such revelations have forced 
a cultural confrontation in the UK with the victims of these crimes, so long dismissed by the 
authorities and by public organisations like the BBC22 and the National Health Service.23 
Whereas the public narrative in this case was once one of ‘(possibly) dirty old man’ ‘rascal’ 
and ‘celebrity’24 the public narrative is now one of ‘abuse’ ‘exploitation and ‘violence’: as of 
course it has been for the victims all along. In both the Catholic Church cases and the Savile 
cases, victims were usually met with disbelief initially and have won recognition over decades 
only though a long-term campaign in the context of changing attitudes about religion and 
celebrity. Practically, the length of time since many of these events occurred has inevitably 
frustrated efforts to now bring the perpetrators to justice: raising the key question of how such 
cultural, constructivist, notions of victimhood interact with the more positivist criminal justice 
process. This will be a key question returned to in the last third of the present paper.  
 
For their part, McGarry and Walklate25 tie the increased recognition of ‘less ideal victims’ back 
to the growing importance of ‘trauma’ in victimological understandings, and the recognition 
that even ‘non-ideal’ victims who we would not ordinarily consider vulnerable can suffer from 
this. The recent resurgence of ‘trauma’ as a concept in victimology reflects the fact that as a 
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condition trauma develops over time and in directions many steps removed from the initial act 
(criminal or otherwise) that initiated the victimisation26. Trauma can also be amplified or 
sustained by actors well beyond the specific criminal perpetrator in a given case. So-called 
‘secondary victimisation’ at the hands of the criminal justice system is a case in point, but so 
too is the ongoing treatment of victims by support services, local communities and the media. 
As an illustration, McGarry and Walklate27 draw on the story of Doug Beattie, an English 
solider and decorated Afghanistan veteran who opened up about his personal and emotional 
struggles both during and after the conflict. More recently, families of UK soldiers killed in the 
second Iraq war threatened to mount legal action if the delayed ‘Chilcot Report’ of the 
independent inquiry into to the reasons the UK entered the war did not get an official 
publication date, arguing that their family members were ‘victims’ of the conflict and, possibly, 
of deception by the UK government28. The key point is that as archetypal (often) masculine 
figures, soldiers usually lack the traditional characteristics of overt ‘weakness’ attributed to 
ideal victims. 
 
A telling aspect of these examples is not just how ‘victim status’ or ‘ideal victim status’ is 
ascribed but how they suggest a need to acquire this status not just through prolonged trauma 
but also through sustained effort. It is almost impossible to imagine that the 96 Hillsborough 
victims and their families would have received the recognition they now have (with the tangible 
possibility of ‘justice’) without the consistent and organised efforts of the Hillsborough Family 
Support Group, not to mention a multitude of other supporters, lawyers, academics, 
investigators and so on. In the case of Doug Beattie it was the telling of his story via the 
publication of his biography that ‘won’ him recognition as having been ‘truly’ victimised. 
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Gaining victim status is one thing, but keeping it in the modern cultural context is quite another. 
Further to the above points, cultural understandings and recognition of victimisation may often 
appear fickle. One key example of this can be drawn from the case of Kate and Gerry McCann 
who, over the course of the decade since the disappearance of their daughter Madeleine from 
a Portuguese holiday resort, have been painted both as villains and victims. Thus, in late 2007 
articles began appearing branding the McCanns and their friends (whom the media labelled 
‘the tapas seven’) as ‘swingers’29. Accusations of inconsistencies in the McCanns’ story 
developed into theories, without corroborating evidence, that Madeleine had died through some 
misadventure in the family’s apartment and that the alleged ‘kidnapping’ was a means of 
covering this up. The McCanns themselves were for a time given the status of arguidos (official 
suspects) by Portuguese investigators30. 
 
Nevertheless, in the light of accusations which might have destroyed any sense of public, let 
alone official, goodwill to the couple, the McCanns have maintained a significant media 
presence throughout the period that has kept them, for the most part, on the sympathetic side 
of public/cultural discourse, securing intervention by Scotland Yard to the tune of a £10 million 
investigation31. Indeed, it has often been commentated that the McCanns have approached their 
situation in a way that is very media savvy, exploiting all the advantages of being middle class, 
articulate professionals32. Interesting comparisons were initially drawn with the case of 
Shannon Matthews, a 9-year-old girl who disappeared from her home in Dewsbury, West 
Yorkshire, in February 2009, some two years after the McCann disappearance33. Media 
attention continued to be poured on the McCann case at the time, with relatively little attention 
paid to the Matthews case. The Matthews were a low-income working class family who 
appeared far less capable of courting media attention. Notwithstanding the fact that, ultimately, 
it emerged Shannon’s disappearance was orchestrated by her own mother and her boyfriend as 
10 
a means of generating income thorough the publicity, the case still highlights that winning and 
retaining victim status for some requires both effort and social capital. It is in itself very telling 
of the cultural status of such victimisation in 21st-century Britain that Matthew’s mother and 
boyfriend reached the conclusion (no doubt inspired by the McCann case) that this would be a 
workable means of gaining finance. 
 
As the above examples illustrate, it has become impossible to approach the question of how 
cultural attitudes to victimisation change and adapt over time without discussing media 
representations and, most significantly, the role that social media has exerted in this sphere. 
Whilst work on the portrayal of crime and criminal justice in the media has been pursued for a 
long time and by a range of scholars34 the interactive and up-to-the-minute nature of so much 
of this media now increases its impact tenfold. It is not, however, just the recognition of 
victimisation by the media or by the public in general that changes over time. In reality victims 
themselves may only come to recognise their own victimisation after a period of reflection, 
and in most cases their thoughts and ideas about that victimisation will develop as time goes 
on35. Again, such development is part-and-parcel to modern understandings of ‘trauma’36. 
Victimisation is therefore a dynamic process both personally as well as publically and 
culturally. Those studying victimology have themselves been slow to adapt their 
methodologies to incorporate this dynamic nature of victimisation. Indeed, Shapland and Hall’s 
2007 extensive review of what we know about the effects of crime on victims indicated a 
marked lack of victimisation studies which incorporated any longitudinal component37. In this 
next section, this paper will move on to discuss how this newly acquired appreciation for the 




Victim culture and victim reform 
 
In 2017, the basic proposition that victim policy, like criminal justice policy as a whole, is 
intricately bound up with the political aspirations of different governments, parties and other 
groups, rather than representing some ‘pure’ or paternalistic philosophy of assisting victims of 
crime, has become somewhat prosaic. The difficulty with such a proposition when viewed in 
isolation is not that it is wrong but rather that it offers little by way of explanation for why 
certain victims, victimisations and reforms agendas appear to gain momentum in public 
discourse and public policy whilst others do not. True, one can begin to add a greater degree 
of substance to this position by noting the ideological and economic drivers that push 
government policy as a whole. Hence, one might argue that governments of all shades and hues 
in the United Kingdom have since at least the turn of the century rarely detracted from policies 
which broadly support neo-liberal, market-based ideologies38. Under this construction, we 
might explain the advent of different victim polices largely by reference to their capacity to 
generate efficiency in the criminal justice system, even if this comes at the cost of increased 
punitiveness and/or the prioritisation of crime control over due process. Victims therefore 
become significant from a policy perspective largely because it is recognised that a criminal 
justice system – certainly an adversarial criminal justice system – needs their support in order 
to run effectively. 
 
Certain theorists have added another level of conceptual depth to the above basic propositions. 
Hence, Garland incorporates this use of victims as a tool for buttressing confidence in, and thus 
effectiveness of, the criminal justice process within a broader ‘culture of control’ which he 
argues permeates through politics and public policy in late modernity39. Whilst such macro 
perspectives are extremely illuminating, again they are not tailored to facilitating a closer 
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inspection of which specific victims are actually benefiting (or not) from this increased 
attention, nor do they conceptualise the processes through which this comes about. For many 
years, the customary victimological answer to these outstanding questions has been that the 
policy direction described above inevitably becomes centred around ‘ideal’ victims, because it 
is these victims which attract public sympathy and are thus the most advantageous for a 
political party also seeking to gain votes. Usually such victims are conceptualised in abstract 
terms that have not progressed a great deal from those described by Christie in 1986, as 
discussed above. Indeed, the phrase ‘ideal victim’ is often used in a rather offhand way by 
victimologists, betraying a confidence that we know who these people are, that their 
characteristics are largely established and that we can pinpoint the forms of victimisation to 
which they are most often associated. Critical criminologists in turn added detail to this picture, 
arguing that the identification of these so-called ’ideal victims’ was far from objective and in 
fact reflected deeply ingrained power inequalities within society. Once again, however, this 
macro-level view tends to obscure the specific mechanics by which certain victims are 
promoted up the political hierarchy. 
 
From the discussion of cultural drivers presented in this paper, it can now be confidently 
asserted that the more traditional perspectives encapsulated within the previous paragraph are 
limited in the contemporary context. In reality, however, what the cultural victimological 
approach reveals is the means by which the victims who actually benefit from the attention of 
policy makers (or at least are supposed to) is strongly influenced by the ebbs and flows of 
prevailing cultural attitudes. More specifically, this process seems to be driven by the 
production and reproduction of narratives around different kinds of victimisation (or harm) that 
become more or less culturally pervasive over time and in so doing, generate what this paper 
will call ‘victim capital’.  
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It is these cultural narratives on the nature and impact of victimisation, rather than a fixed 
notion of ideal victimhood, which I suggest policy makers are in fact responding to. To 
illustrate how this process operates I will here focus on three key examples: rape, terrorism and 
child sexual exploitation as broad categories of victimisation-types which have been subjected 
to prolonged cultural scrutiny, shifting public understandings and constructions, resulting in 
the advent of greater victim capital which in many cases has been translated into public policy 
and reform.  
 
Victims of Rape  
One of the clearest examples from England & Wales in recent years of an apparently 
heightened cultural resonance surrounding a particular group of victims is that associated with 
victims of rape. Of course, many victimologists would rightly assert that, since the mid 1990s, 
rape victims had already achieved a degree of cultural and political prominence hitherto 
unknown in criminal justice circles40. Rape victims have long been held up as the archetypical 
invisible and mistreated victim of crime41. Indeed, the development of modern victimology 
itself owes much to an initial focus on such victimisation and the difficulties faced by rape 
victims on approaching the criminal justice system. This development was driven in particular 
by feminist commentators42. Notwithstanding this background, however, it is argued that the 
increasing cultural resonance now associated with rape victimisation in more recent years – 
protracted through the lens of social media and 24-hour news coverage – has rendered 
contemporary levels of public commentary and debate largely unprecedented. This is 




In the shorter term, much of this renewed public interest appears to have been brokered in 
England & Wales by the considerable public and media attention given to the case of Chedwyn 
Michael ‘Ched’ Evans. Evans was a Premier-League footballer initially convicted in 2012 of 
raping a 19-year-old woman43 - who was at that point deemed too drunk to consent. Many 
supporters rallied to his defence44. Many more were quick to condemn a criminal justice 
process which granted victim status to the woman in question. Indeed, some of the public 
comments on the matter harked back to debates concerning victim precipitation/blaming45 
whilst also questioning the legal status of ‘drunken’ consent: which in the UK criminal law has 
been fairly clear since the case of R v Bree46 in 2007. Some commentators saw a positive side 
to this in that, for them, the strong public reactions to the case reflected a criminal justice system 
that had become more willing to tackle ‘difficult’ cases and also indicated that juries were now 
more willing to put aside victim-blaming attitudes and myths about rape47. Whatever the 
interpretation, it is clear that this case exemplifies how victim status is now caught up in social 
culture and protracted through social media platforms. This final point was emphasised by 
Duggan and Heap as contributing to what they term the ‘administrating’ of victimisation in 21st 
century Britain48. 
 
It was in such a social and cultural context that when the Criminal Case Review Commission 
of England & Wales (CCRC) received a referral of the case by Evans’ new legal team in 2015. 
The Commission chose to fast-track the case, stating: 
 
"in line with our published policy on prioritisation, and in relation to the facts 
of the case and the issues raised in Evans’ application to us... we now expect 
our substantive investigation to begin within the next few weeks"49 
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The CCRC referred the case for reconsideration by the Court of Appeal in October 2015 and 
the Court ordered a retrial in March 2016, on the grounds that the trial judge had erred in law 
in excluding evidence of the complainant’s sexual history. In this second trial, Evans was 
acquitted. 
 
For present purposes, what is particularly noteworthy about the conviction and subsequent 
acquittal of Ched Evans is the impact this appears to have had not only on public discourse but 
also in relation to concrete reform agendas emanating from major political parties. Indeed, the 
degree of significance associated with the Evans case can be appreciated through examining 
an open letter sent to the Labour MP Harriet Harman from the Criminal Bar Association in 
March 2017. In that letter, the Bar bemoaned the apparent influence the case was exercising 
over public debate: 
 
“Continued references to the Ched Evans case as an example of what “typical” 
cases involve are wholly misleading; it was an unusual case that turned on an 
unusual set of facts. It was on the peculiar circumstances of that case that the 
judicial decisions were made”50 
 
Specifically, the Association was seeking to criticise an amendment to s.41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act: a so-called ‘rape shield’ provision which purports to limit the cross 
examination of witnesses on their sexual history. The amendment, which had been proposed 
by Harman as part of the Prisons and Courts Bill then going through parliament, would have 
effectively banned all sexual history questioning in court without the exceptions and discretions 
the law presently entails51. This tabled amendment followed the introduction of a separate 
Private Member’s Bill a few weeks before – set out by Liz Saville Roberts MP of Plaid Cymru 
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– which proposed a different reform to the rape shield, retaining certain discretionary 
exceptions. 
 
In the end, both proposals ran out of parliamentary time following the call of an unexpected 
snap general election in the UK in May 2017. It is nevertheless extremely telling of the degree 
of victim capital rape victims have recently acquired in the contemporary cultural context that 
it drove two distinctly different calls for reform in the space of one month: s.41 having existed 
on the statute books and operated since 1999. Indeed, we might conceptualise this situation as 
one of two competing narratives concerning what such victims ‘need’ from the criminal justice 
system, each vying for cultural predominance52. 
 
Returning to the Criminal Bar Association’s letter, the criticism made in the above extract is 
essentially that both activists and MPs had presented the Evans case as a ‘typical’ narrative of 
rape trials, a narrative the Association claimed was misleading. What is especially telling is the 
level of concern expressed about inaccurate representations of the Evans case as ‘precedent’ 
and how this might impact upon public sensibilities on the issues: 
 
“Sadly, the previously mentioned characterisation of the judgment as a 
‘precedent’, coupled with incautious public remarks (that the law was being set 
back by decades) appear designed more to alarm than inform. We are concerned 
that this is a trend set to continue in light of recent reports and comments made 
on social media”53 
 
From a cultural perspective then we might characterise the Bar’s concerns as centred around 
the public narrative forming around this case and its implications for the criminal justice 
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system: namely a shift in policy, engendered by growing victim capital, to initiate a change in 
the evidential rules. For many commentators, especially those representing the legal profession, 
further restrictions on the use of sexual history evidence can only prejudice defendants’ ability 
to have a fair trial54. In this example then we see not only the influence of such cultural 
narratives and the degree of victim capital it may command, but also the potential dangers of 
this influence: especially when this appears to be based in part on misinformation or incomplete 
understanding. 
 
Another aspect of the developing pubic conversation on the place of rape victims in the criminal 
justice system of England & Wales has revolved around so-called ‘victim blaming’ by the 
judiciary. This came to the fore in March 2017 when a retiring Senior Circuit Judge in 
Manchester, Judge Lindsey Kushner, used her sentencing remarks in her final trial to 
advise/warn women that excessive drinking might enhance their vulnerability to victimisation: 
 
“I don’t think it’s wrong for a judge to beg women to take actions to protect 
themselves. That must not put responsibility on them rather than the perpetrator. 
How I see it is burglars are out there and nobody says burglars are OK but we 
do say: ‘Please don’t leave your back door open at night, take steps to protect 
yourselves”55 
 
The judge continued: 
 




She added:  
 
“They are entitled to do what they like but please be aware there are men out 
there who gravitate towards a woman who might be more vulnerable than 
others”57 
 
The trial in question had involved a 19-year-old woman who was attacked and raped by a man 
she met in a fast food restaurant. The victim had spent the evening drinking beer and vodka 
during a night out in Manchester. It is notable that this ‘warning’ issued by the judge was 
coached in careful terms which appear to try and avoid the charge of victim blaming. 
Nevertheless, the speech was emphatically interpreted as such by Rape Crisis58 and also, 
notably, by Dame Vera Baird, the Police and Crime Commissioner for Northumbria59. Baird, 
for her part, had been responsible for commissioning a 2016 study of rape trials by Durham et 
al.60 which led to the introduction of the Private Member’s Bill by Liz Saville Roberts MP 
concerning rape shield laws discussed above. Around the same time, a Canadian case gained 
international notoriety after a judge allegedly told a complainant in a rape trial to ‘keep her 
knees together’61. Prior to this, in 2015 another judge in England sparked anger after branding 
a rape victim “extremely foolish” for drinking too much before she was attacked outside a 
nightclub62. 
 
This narrative of judges ‘abusing’ rape victims in court has therefor built up a cultural pedigree 
over time. In the Kushner case it is significant that the victim late came forward to express her 
support for the judge’s comments. In so doing the victim indicated that whilst she had initially 
felt a sense of self-blame for the incident, she had come to realise it was not her fault, although 
she continued to think that women who had been drinking would be less likely to be believed63. 
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A few months after this case was reported, Ched Evans in an interview with The Times 
newspaper himself offered the view that “women need to be made aware of the dangers they 
can put themselves in because there are genuine rapists out there who prey on girls who have 
been drinking"64. The choice by Evans to speak out on this issue was met with palatable 
cynicism by many commentators but the episode does serve to reinforce the cultural impact of 
such cases and figures in the 21st century. 
 
Another related development coming in late 2016 was the publication of a report into the 
piloted use of pre-recorded cross-examination in certain participating Crown Court centres65. 
The results of that study appeared broadly favourable to the wider use of this special measure 
in the future. Still in the wake of the ongoing public debates about sexual history and victim 
blaming in rape cases, the Lord Chancellor appeared to announce soon afterwards that the 
government would be accelerating the rollout of pre-recorded cross-examination to all courts 
for use in rape cases. The press release stated: 
 
“New measures that will spare rape victims the trauma and inconvenience of 
attending court hearings will be rolled out across the country from September. 
Victims of rape and other sex crimes will have their cross-examination evidence 
pre-recorded and played during the trial. Originally the rollout was not due to 
begin until next year but will now start in September after Justice Secretary 
Elizabeth Truss and senior judges agreed to accelerate the scheme”66 
 
Significantly, this announcement was met with the unusual step of the Lord Chief Justice 
writing a public letter to senior judges essentially criticising and explicitly correcting the 
impression that the Lord Chancellor had given in the press release. In the letter, Lord Thomas 
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acknowledges the success of the pilots but points out that they were limited to vulnerable 
witnesses falling under s.16 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, who are mainly 
children. This does not automatically include victims of rape, who qualify as ‘intimidated’ 
witnesses under s.17(4). The letter indicates that the pilot will indeed be extended to other 
courts, although only on a “carefully phased basis” which will “inevitably take some time”. He 
also notes that this pilot will be restricted to s.16 witnesses. The letter goes on to indicate that 
the judiciary has agreed with the Ministry of Justice to extend piloting of pre-recorded cross-
examination to s.17(4) rape victims only in the original three pilot areas and that “this new pilot 
will have to be evaluated and no decision has yet been made as to expansion of these provisions 
to other court centres”. 
 
This interaction between the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, played out in public and 
disseminated via social media, demonstrates both the cultural dimension of such policies in the 
twenty-first century as well as the multi-levelled governance and variety of stakeholders to 
those policies which will be the focus of the following section of this chapter. It is also 
undoubtedly significant to note in this case the broader political context of the Lord Chief 
Justice’s letter, coming as it did in the immediate wake of a perceived lack of support by the 
Lord Chancellor for the independence of the judiciary following heavy criticism by some 
media outlets of the judges (including the Lord Thomas himself) when they ruled against the 
government in the High Court in the case of Miller67. The case had concerned the executive’s 
right to trigger Article 50 of the Maastricht Treaty on European 1992 Union without first 
consulting parliament (see Phipps, 2016). This once again indicates that culture, politics, the 
media and victim policies are all heavily intertwined. 
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Overall, what we see in these events is a combination of mediated stories, disgruntlement at 
the judiciary and a relatively new level of empathy even for potentially ‘less-ideal’ rape victims 
coming together to enhance public sympathy and cultural meaning surrounding this form of 
criminal victimisation.  
 
Victims of child sexual exploitation 
A related but to some extent even more profound shift in the cultural landscape has taken place 
over recent years concerning child sexual exploitation in general, and historic cases of sexual 
abuse in particular. This paper has already noted how in England & Wales the Savile cases 
have instilled within public consciousness a new impression of sex offenders and the nature of 
sexual victimisation itself. Similar examples can also be drawn from further afield, notably in 
the US the ongoing criminal cases against comedian Bill Cosby68. In the light of such cases, 
long-held cultural views epitomised by symbolic pronouncements such as ‘it was a different 
world then’ have clearly lost cultural significance whereas complainants themselves have 
gained it. In the process, we have witnessed the development of new narratives of risk 
associated with the power and influence endowed to ‘celebrities’. Indeed, in many ways this 
represents an architype example of a risk generated by modernity itself, as understood by 
Beck69. Moreover, it is a risk that has forced not only the government and the criminal justice 
system to confront such victimisation, but also wider organisations including the National 
Health Service and the BBC: each of which having to some extend enabled abuses to 
continue70. 
 
Child sexual abuse was further catapulted into public prominence by the so-called child sexual 
exploitation abuse scandal in the Yorkshire town of Rotherham. Here, in 2010, five men were 
found guilty of a series of sexual offences against girls as young as twelve. A subsequent 
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investigation by The Times newspaper reported that the exploitation of children in the area was 
much more widespread, and the Home Affairs Select Committee criticised South Yorkshire 
Police Force and Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council for their handling and covering up 
of the abuse71. On 10th September 2014, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government, Eric Pickles, announced that an independent investigation would be held into 
whether Rotherham Council covered up information about the abuse. The investigation, led 
by Louise Casey, former Victims’ Commissioner and now Director-General of the 
government's Troubled Families Programme, chairing and investigation into the council's 
governance, their services for children and young people as well as their taxi and private hire 
licensing provisions. Casey's investigation found that the child sexual exploitation (CSE) team 
was poorly directed, suffered from excessive caseloads, and did not share information72. 
Following the report's publication in February 2015, Pickles stated that the local authority was 
"not fit for purpose"73 and announced proposals to remove control from the local councillors 
and give it to a team of five appointed commissioners, including one tasked specifically with 
looking at children's services. After the report's publication, files relating to a current councillor 
and a past councillor identifying "a number of potentially criminal matters" were passed to 
the National Crime Agency. The leader of the council, Paul Lakin, resigned, and members of 
the council cabinet also stood down74. 
 
The Rotherham case has been instrumental in helping to project Chid Sexual Exploitation into 
public consciousness. Indeed, the very acronym ‘CSE’, unknown to a large proportion of the 
public only a few years ago, has now become widely utilised in the UK context, especially on 
social media. The cultural narrative of ‘cold’ cases, usually involving child victims who have 
since grown into adulthood, has provoked particular attention. In many cases the narrative 
around these crimes – owing to their long-ignored nature – has revolved around the longer-
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term and developing trauma elements of the victimisation. Thus, one sees the trauma 
experienced by such victims frequently in the surrounding public policy rhetoric. It is within 
this cultural context that the CPS in 2015 constituted a dedicated Child Abuse Review Panel 
capable of revisiting decisions to drop such prosecutions on the behest of victims themselves. 
The significant decision to muddy (to a limited degree) the highly engrained operating principle 
of the CPS that its decisions are not subject to appeal and only account for, rather than prioritise, 
the views of victims illustrates the significance of the victim capital now afforded to such 
victimisation. This example also raises another cultural tendency developed over recent years 
of an apparent increased public willingness to question official determinations of victimhood, 
an issue to be returned to later in this paper. 
 
Victims of terrorism 
One of the most prevalent and impactful cultural shifts in recent decades concerning the 
meanings attributed to a specific form of victimisation has been the new degree of victim 
capital associated with terrorism. Terrorism has of course achieved a central place in social-
political discourse since at least the 2001 attacks on the World Tarde Centre in New York. 
Indeed, the cultural impact of terrorism on public consciousness has had broader impacts 
beyond terrorist cases themselves. Thus, recent drive for reform to the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme in England & Wales was partly spurred on by the dissatisfaction of 
victims and relatives of victims who were injured or killed in the London bombings of July 
200575. As argued by Mythen and McGowan: 
 
“It is precisely because the survivors of 7/7 were party to an attack that deeply 
offended the moral sensibilities of ‘ordinary people’ that the UK government 
decided to increase compensation paid to victims. What is at play here is 
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essentially a moral judgement about degrees of suffering, gauged in terms of 
cultural proximity and perceived psychological impact rather than a decision 
determined solely by physiological disability. Thus, victims of terrorism are 
culturally constructed as more important and deserving of sympathy than 
victims of other violent crimes, such as corporate homicide. Put bluntly, some 
victims are more equal than others”76 
 
Mythen first raised these issues directly in relation to the development of cultural victimology 
in the following terms: 
 
“From here, the cultural construction of the terrorist threat in the UK is utilised 
as a way of tapping into the institutional tendency to use the figurehead of the 
victim as a way of organising and regulating social activity. Centring on the 
shaping of ‘new terrorism’, the chapter elucidates how cultural institutions play 
a major role in defining crime risks and circulating dominant ideas about 
victimisation. The example of ‘new terrorism’ is used to bring into view current 
debates about the ‘risk society’ and the generation of a ‘culture of fear’”77 
 
Under this increasingly mediatised construction of terrorism, the harm and suffering attributed 
to terrorist victims and their wider families has generated a sense of shared, cultural mourning 
(and trauma) around these kinds of crimes. From this, new victims spokespeople78 have 
emerged. Amongst the most prominent in England & Wales is the figure of Brendan Cox, 
husband to murdered Member of Parliament Helen Joanne Cox, who was shot and stabbed 
outside her constituency office in June 2016 in Birstall. What followed was a significant public 
outpouring of grief and dismay at the loss of ‘Jo’79. Although the assailant was convicted of 
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murder rather than of terrorist offences, the case quickly became labelled as one of ‘terrorism’ 
in accordance with its technical definition under s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Brendan Cox’s 
extremely articulate and dignified responses (attributable in no small part to cultural capital) 
to the murder of his wife, delivered through the 24-hour news media (and later, a book) became 
the target of great swathes of sympathy from a public who saw themselves as ‘standing 
alongside’ him. Jo Cox’s position as a Member of Parliament and therefore ‘representative of 
the people’ helped to cement this impression. Brendan Cox himself identified the “public 
support” as a “great help” following the murder80. 
 
Significantly, the cultural approach to victimology would emphasise the sense of a public 
‘bearing witness’ to this victimisation, especially thorough social media and 24-hour television 
coverage81. Indeed, in other cases of victimisation around the world the point has been reached 
where people thousands of miles away can bear witness to crimes in real time through the 
social media updates of those involved on the ground. A prominent case is that of Bana al-
Abed, the 7-yeard old girl who tweeted updates in the last weeks of the siege of Alleppo in 
Syria during 201682. The identification of the ‘global community’ with this little girl they had 
never met and indeed had very little in common with was borne out by the significant concern 
expressed around the world when her tweets abruptly ceased. More recently, one can also look 
to the tweeting of images from inside the main chamber of the House of Common in 
Westminster during the lock-down of Members during the March 2017 terrorist attack83. In 
this latter case, it is notable that these public accounts of victimisation went unchallenged 
despite being technically against the usually strict rules against taking and uploading photos 
from within the chamber. 
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As was the case with Jo Cox, the Westminster attack – also labelled as a ‘terrorist’ incident – 
was ‘witnessed’ live through media reporting within minutes of it occurring and in the next 
few days hundreds of mobile phone-captured images and videos of the events as they occurred 
(over the course of 82 seconds on one Wednesday afternoon) were constantly broadcasted. The 
four people who were initially killed during the attack were identified quickly and their faces 
adorned posters and walls of remembrance around the country and at hastily arranged public 
visuals. The cultural portrayal was one of an attack not just on individuals but on “British 
democracy”84. Out of the 50 people injured in the incident, it is notable that particular attention 
and public sympathy was directed at Andreea Cristea following the broadcast of a video of her 
being knocked off Westminster bridge into the River Thames during the attack. She died from 
multiple organ failure in hospital some days later to become the sixth fatality associated with 
the event, including the perpetrator himself. Again, through such means the public were able 
to bear witnesses to Cristiea’s victimisation in particular and in a very direct way. Returning to 
Brendan Cox, his status as something of voice of those affected directly by terrorism was borne 
out by his frequent media coverage after the Westminster incident including during the 2017 
general election, when all the major parties agreed to suspicion of campaigning for one 
afternoon as a token of respect to the murdered MP. 
 
The collective unity shown after terrorist incidents in different cities – the notion that the 
residents of those cities are collectively victimised – points to another prominent feature of 
cultural victimology: greater deference to the concept of mass victimisation. Previously we 
have noted the impression of a city beset as a cultural victim epitomised by the boycott of The 
Sun newspaper in Liverpool85 following that paper’s reporting of the Hillsborough disaster. 
Indeed, in a recently published editorial one 30-year-old citizen of Liverpool, who was two-
years-old at the time of the disaster and has no direct relation who was there, reflects on how 
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he feels a sense of personal investment in the tragedy having “inherited Hillsborough” growing 
up in the city86. Elements of such collective victimisation passed down through generations can 
be seen in relation to London after both the terrorist bombings of 7th July 2005 and the March 
2017 attacks, where on both occasions comments were made in the media around Londoners 
drawing on the resilience shown by older generations in that city who lived through the Blitz 
during World War II87. Indeed, the same sense of collective cultural morning is now present at 
an international level in these major cases, reflected by what has become a standardised ritual 
of national landmarks around the world being adorned in the colours of the ‘country’ most 
recently victimised, working down to individuals updating their social media pictures to reflect 
a sombre meme of support and/or defiance. Associated cultural artefacts have developed, 
including the “pray for London” and “pray for Manchester” meme, where the city is 
continuously replaced with the location of the most recent high-profile terrorist incident88. 
 
 
Victim culture and the criminal justice processes 
 
The above examples illustrate both the culturally-enthused and politicised nature of the victim 
issue in the 21st century as well as, crucially, the practical influence such matters are exerting 
over public policy. As well as in the political realm, the advent of more culturally-enthused 
notions of victimisation discussed above raise significant challenges for the criminal justice 
system, most notably when attempting to reconcile these seemingly ever-expanding and 
culturally-charged understandings of victimisation with legal and procedural practicalities, 
especially within the still staunchly adversarial criminal justice system utilised in England & 
Wales. Such a meeting exposes a fundamental tension between the more constructivist 
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approach outlined by cultural victimologists and the more positivist understanding of crime, 
harm and victimisation usually favoured (some would say necessitated) by the legal system. 
 
Delving deeper for a moment into the basic precepts of criminal justice systems (especially 
adversarial justice systems) it can be quickly gleaned that these systems are not for the most 
part geared around the notion of victimisation or trauma, including ‘vicarious trauma’89, being 
realised and accepted over time. Indeed, the assumption of such systems is that the majority of 
evidence loses quality rather than improves through prolonged reflection. Witnesses’ memories 
fade and physical evidence degrades, which make it more difficultly to prove a crime (or a 
victimisation) has occurred to the required high standard as a matter of law. Other factors come 
into play too, which are illustrated by an examination of domestic violence cases. Domestic 
violence has long been held as a particularly difficult form of prosecution to achieve largely 
due to victims’ reluctance to come forward in the first place and, secondly, due to their 
perceived tendency to change their mind at the door of the courtroom and refuse to give 
evidence90. Police and prosecutors in many jurisdictions have for several years emphasised the 
speedy progression of such cases precisely so the main (often only) evidence, the victim’s 
testimony, is not lost91. Interestingly the temporal component of victimisation therefore works 
in a different direction in these cases to the examples discussed earlier (such as child sexual 
abuse) in the sense that, rather than realising their victimisation over time, domestic violence 
victims might self-define themselves as such initially at the point of reporting to the police92 
but come to define themselves differently as time passes. 
 
Nevertheless, from the victims’ perspective the cultural discussions outline above strongly hint 
that it can matter less what they feel at the ‘initial’ point of victimisation or at the time of giving 
a statement to the police. More important to some victims may be their developed impressions 
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and feelings about what has happened to them as they see things when the times comes to give 
evidence at trial. I93 and others94 have previously discussed the concept of narrative and 
account-making in the experience of victimisation. McGarry and Walklate95 speak in terms of 
‘testimony’. A fundamental division therefore exists between the desire of the criminal justice 
process for ‘evidence’ and the victim’s desire to ‘tell a story’, their understanding of which 
may have developed over time. In adversarial justice, by contrast, any ‘development’ of what 
a victim says at the time of trial verses what they said in their initial statement will be held up 
by the defence as evidence of inconsistency and therefore reduced credibility. In other words, 
the criminal justice system is specifically engineered to factor out the temporal development 
of victimisation as an experience. It is not just ‘new’ stories (in the sense that they are 
developed stories) that cause difficulties for the traditional criminal justice system. Such a 
system also has problems with old stories, even if those stories are not subject to factual 
changes. This is most keenly felt with the difficulty in bringing so-called ‘cold cases’ to justice 
even in the light of substantial changes in both legal and cultural acceptance of various kinds 
of victimhood discussed. Furthermore, because the law as it was at the time of the commission 
of an offence will be the law applied when these cases come to trial a situation develops where 
this applicable law is many steps behind this modern cultural, and even legal narrative of 
victimisation.  
 
In order to illustrate practically the conflicts that occur between the more culturally-informed 
nations of victimisation discussed above and the legal practicalities/requirements of the 
criminal justice process I will here turn to another highly publicised case in the UK, that of 
long-time children’s entertainer Rolf Harris. Another noted case arising in the light of the 
Savile revelations, entertainer Rolf Harris was convicted in 2014 on 12 counts of indecent 
assault. The crimes occurred across the 1960s, 1970’s and 1980’s against children between the 
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age of 13 and 19. Harris was sentenced to five years and nine months in prison in accordance 
with sentencing practices in force at the time of the offences. The judge in the case expressly 
acknowledged both that the activities of Harris would now fall within the definition of more 
serious offences and that those “equivalent offences today attract significantly higher 
maximum sentences”96 (with a potential maximum of 14 years in prison). Again, this reflects 
the difficulty of ensuring the law continues to reflect changes in culturally-prevalent 
conceptions of victimisation. 
 
In January 2017 Harris was back in Court (although appearing via video-link) to face seven 
further indecent assault charges. The offences allegedly occurred between 1971 and 2004 and 
involved seven complainants who were aged between 12 and 27 at the time. Coming in the 
wake of the Savile revelations, both of Harris’ trials were cast very much in the same mould 
by the press. The narrative in each case was of a previously lauded children’s entertainer with 
a predatory side who had cunningly got away with serious crimes by abusing their celebrity 
status for decades. This itself has become a new ‘stereotypical’ narrative of victimhood added 
to the cultural lexicon over recent years. What is noteworthy in this case that such points have 
been explicitly raised by Harris’ defence team. Hence, in his 2017 trial his barrister noted: 
 
"It's difficult to imagine a harder or faster or deeper fall from grace than that 
suffered by Rolf Harris."97 
 
In the reporting of the 2017 case there are stark examples of the prosecution and defence each 
attempting to convince the jury of their position by respectively advocating or actively 
challenging this narrative. Hence, the prosecution in the case painted Harris very much in a 
way that recalls his previous trial and that of Savile: 
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"It is striking that so many of the allegations involve Mr Harris getting away 
with a sly, quick grope right under the noses of people who did not notice…We 
suggest that Mr Harris was very good at getting away with it"98 
Here then is a formulaic characterization of a sly, ‘hiding in plain sight’ celebrity with a 
predatory side. The defence meanwhile were at pains to both challenge this narrative and 
indeed to imply that the cultural embeddedness of this ‘standard’ story was in fact a deeply 
prejudicial influence on the jury. Thus, the defence turned attention back to the complainants 
in the case, arguing that the jury in the 2014 trial had “got it wrong” and more so that a "media 
frenzy" had made Harris "vulnerable to people making accusations against him"99. The jury in 
this case ultimately returned verdicts of not guilty for three of the assaults, and were then 
discharged from deliberating on the further four counts. 
 
Such arguments over the impact of the media attention focused on Harris’ trials continued in 
May 2017 when, at the same time as Harris was being released from prison following his 
original convictions, he was brought to trial again on the four charges from which the jury had 
been discharged in the previous proceedings. These were four counts of indecent assault against 
three teenagers between 1971 and 1983. In this trial, Harris’ defence team once again argued 
that one of complainants in the case was simply jumping on the "compensation bandwagon"100. 
In response, the complainant is reported to have said: 
 
"I absolutely have not…One of the reasons perhaps it was easier for me to tell 
police is because I had told people over the years"101 
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We can note in this statement a reflection of developing victimhood over time through repeated 
remaking of a narrative. Ultimately, the jury in this case was unable to reach verdicts on all 
four charges. The key observation here is that in this ongoing set of cases we have two radically 
different narrative constructions around the crime of indecent assault. Harris is either a ‘Savile-
esque’ villain portrayed as “fallen from grace” (a term notable for emoting binary images of 
good and evil) or he is a victim (in relation to his last two trials) of the modern cultural 
acceptance of a set narrative concerning a stereotyped victimisation story. The key observation 
though is that we see in the second and third Harris trials that the cultural prevalence of a set 
narrative about celebrity abuse led to allegations being made which were not substantiated in 
court; in cultural terms the reality as defined by the criminal justice process did not always 
matched the prevalent cultural narrative. As such, we might express concern here that an over-






The core implication of the above discussion is that those seeking to understanding victim 
policy in the contemporary context must become attuned to its dynamic, cultural meanings 
which are inevitably connected with this endeavour. We have seen how the way the public 
views and attributes meaning to specific cases can alter over time. Hence, the cultural meaning 
attributed to the ‘Hillsborough Disaster’ are infinitely more shaded and complex in 2017 than 
they were in 1989. Similar developments can be seen in relation to the Madeline McCann 
disappearance. In some cases, we see conceptually distinct and contradictory narrative 
constructions playing out on the public stage. Hence the Ched Evans case either represents a 
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criminal justice system ‘gone wrong’ and setting dangerous ‘precedents’ for rape victims on 
the one hand, or a triumph of common sense over exacting ‘political correctness’ on the other. 
Again, the narrative construction and the ‘meanings’ attributed to rape victims and their 
interactions with the criminal justice system has in this case been heavily influenced to by 
media representations, the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary and others. In this we should note 
in particular the degree to which certain kinds of victims are now facilitated in making very 
public accounts of their victimisation, notably victims of terrorism, and the cultural phenomena 
whereby vast swathes of the national and international community are seen as ‘standing 
alongside’ those victims. It is also important not to underestimate the significance of the 
criminal trial itself as the most publicised component of the criminal justice process. We know 
the majority of people still base much of their opinion of the justice system on knowledge 
obtained though media portrayals of the trial: both fictional and non-fictional102. Through such 
means, cultural understandings and ‘meanings’ become attributed to victims and the criminal 
justice process which then, as we have seen, though thus acquiring victim capital goes on to 
influence public policy. 
 
Such public meanings attributed to different kinds of victims and victimisations are in constant 
flux and are subject to the influence of competing narratives delivered by a whole range of 
actors. In recent years, the rise and fall of said narratives have led to sometimes quite dramatic 
shifts in government policy. Clearly, victim reform cannot be separated from its wider socio-
economic and cultural context. As such, it is submitted that understanding and challenging the 
cultural constructions and meanings attributed to victimisation has become a core competency 
for modern victimologists. Attributing this full pantheon of interacting cultural narratives 
concerning victimisation and their impact on public policy to a simple and static notion of 
‘ideal’ or ‘politically advantageous’ victimhood, is no longer sufficient. 
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At the same time, the above discussion injects a note of causation when such cultural narratives 
surrounding victimisation are played out in conjunction with the formal criminal justice 
process. The Harris case exemplifies the complex questions that are raised both in terms of the 
apparent inability of the formal criminal justice mechanisms to adapt as quickly to the 
oscillating and culturally charged notions of victimisation as society in general and to what 
extent justice mechanism, notably the standard of proof required to achieve convictions, guards 
against such narratives promoting ‘unjust’ outcomes. Of course, many commentators and 
victim advocates may consider that Harris ‘should’ have been convicted of his second round 
of charges and that it is still reflective of a lack of understanding or deference to victims’ 
perspectives that he was not. The complex question that arises from this is to what extent the 
justice system must guard against becoming hostage to the ‘fickle’ whims of victim culture and 
to what extent it must adapt itself to genuine advances in our understanding of what it means 





The proceeding paper has sought to ground recent developments in public policy concerning 
victims of crime in England & Wales in what it sees as much broader and ongoing cultural 
developments concerning the meanings we as a society attach to the notion of ‘victimisation’. 
In so doing, I have examined whether from such a perspective, there is evidence that a less 
positivistic, more culturally-attuned notion of victimisation is being recognised in the criminal 
justice system itself and/or by the various stakeholders and policy actors charged with 
supporting victims of crime. What we have witnessed in England & Wales (and further afield) 
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since 2010 is an escalation in the development of a socio-political climate in which various, 
sometimes contradictory, narratives of victimisation constituted by a wide range of official and 
unofficial actors compete for cultural primacy. When a form of victimisation does achieve such 
prevalence, this can spur policy actors to quick and decisive action. This culturally-informed 
understanding of victim reform arguably offers a more sophisticated tool than the traditional 
critical or radical approaches, which tend to be based on static ideas of ‘ideal’ victimhood. Of 
course, it might be argued that cultural acceptance of various kinds of victimhood, and its 
manipulation by powerful actors, has arguably only served to create a new breed of ‘ideal’ 
victims. Further, we have noted that the challenges to the formal criminal justice process 
presented by such broader notions of victimhood raise significant questions – in terms of 
procedural fairness and justice values – which require much further scrutiny. 
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